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Abstract
Purpose – Recent legislation resulted in an elevation of operating and support (O&S) costs’ relative
importance for decision-making in Department of Defense programs. However, a lack of research in O&S
hinders a cost analyst’s abilities to provide accurate sustainment estimates. Thus, the purpose of this paper is
to investigate when Air Force aircraft O&S costs stabilize and to what degree. Next, a parametric O&Smodel
is developed to predict median O&S costs for use as a new tool for cost analyst practitioners.
Design/methodology/approach – Utilizing the Air Force total ownership cost database, 44 programs
consisting of 765 observations from 1996 to 2016 are analyzed. First, stability is examined in three areas: total
O&S costs, the six O&S cost element structures and by aircraft type. Next, stepwise regression is used to
predict median O&S costs per total active inventory (CPTAI) and identify inﬂuential variables.
Findings – Stability results vary by category but generally are found to occur approximately ﬁve years
from initial operating capability. The regression model explains 89.01 per cent of the variance in the data set
when predictingmedian O&S CPTAI. Aircraft type, location of lead logistics center and unit cost are the three
largest contributing factors.
Originality/value – Results from this research provide insight to cost analysts on when to start using
actual O&S costs as a baseline for estimates in lieu of analogous cost program data and also derives a new
parametric O&S estimating tool designed as a cross-check to current estimatingmethodologies.
Keywords Stability, Regression, Cost analysis, Operating and support costs
Paper type Research paper
On May 22, 2009, the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) was enacted as
Public Law 111-23. For Department of Defense (DoD) cost analysts and acquisition
professionals, WSARA represents a watershed moment. Prior toWSARA, the focus of these
DoD professionals was overwhelmingly on the acquisition (i.e. research and development or
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procurement) phases of a program’s life cycle (Ryan et al., 2013). WSARA, however, brought
incipient attention and emphasis to the operating and support (O&S) phase of the life cycle
(Congress US, 2009). To be clear, it is not the requirement to develop and complete O&S cost
estimates that has changed. Rather, it is the elevation of the relative importance of the O&S
estimates for decision-making in relation to its acquisition counterparts that has changed.
This historically dichotomous relationship is mirrored in the academic literature. In fact, an
analysis of the DoD cost literature shows that acquisition cost behavior was the focus of
over 130 studies from 1945 to 2009, while published analysis of O&S cost behavior during
the same time rarely occurred (Ryan et al., 2012). Since the enactment of WSARA in 2009,
however, a burgeoning O&S research stream has appeared in the literature as demonstrated
in the works of Boito et al. (2012), Jones et al. (2014) and Ritschel and Ritschel (2016),
amongst others.
Additionally, the practical importance of accurate O&S estimates is manifesting itself in
programmatic decisions. For example, the decision to divest (or not) the U-2 in favor of the
RQ-4 Global Hawk is framed not only by relative capability performance of the platforms
but also by their expected O&S costs. The signiﬁcance of cost in the decision process is
clear: “as costs for operating the Global Hawk fell below those of the U-2, the service chose to
go with the unmanned platform going forward” (Pomerleau, 2016). While the ﬁnal decision
on retiring the U-2 is in ﬂux, as increased defense funding in the 2017 budget has resulted in
both platforms being retained, the importance of O&S costs to decision-makers is evident.
Given the extant need for credible O&S estimates and their known historical inaccuracies
(Ryan et al., 2013), we seek to provide improvements in the ﬁeld of O&S estimating. Cost
analysts use a range of estimating techniques, including parametric, analogy, engineering
build-up or extrapolation from actuals (actual costs). As data become available and
programs mature, analysts shift from techniques such as the analogy method to the
extrapolation from actuals method (Mislick and Nussbaum, 2015). Current practice for O&S
estimates relies heavily on the analogy method. The development of the Air Force Total
Ownership Cost (AFTOC) database in 1996, which collects expenditures on the O&S costs of
DoD platforms, provides a relatively recent repository that cost analysts can use to migrate
from an analogy technique to the extrapolation from actual method. But when can analysts
make the transition? To transition to utilizing actual data, cost analysts strive to understand
when a steady-state is achieved. Thus, we seek to answer this question by investigating
O&S cost stability properties in US Air Force aircraft platforms.
While determining stability properties helps cost analysts working estimates on mature
platforms, there is also a large segment of analysts performing estimates at varied stages in
a program’s life cycle. Therefore, the second part of the research develops a regression
model (including the results of the stability analysis as an explanatory variable) to predict
median O&S costs. The intent of this parametric model is not necessarily to replace current
practices. Rather, the model is intended as a secondary technique, or crosscheck, to the
analyst’s primary methodology. This fulﬁlls a critical role as cost analysts typically use
multiple techniques to garner conﬁdence in the ﬁnal estimate (Government Accountability
Ofﬁce, 2009). The desired result is convergence around a similar number, thereby providing
the decision-maker with themost reliable cost estimate possible.
The literature reveals limited inquiries into stability properties but does provide
identiﬁcation of potentially important independent variables for inclusion in the parametric
model developed in this research. Jones et al. (2014) examine the ratio of O&S costs to
acquisition costs. A methodological assumption in their analysis is that O&S costs are
deemed stable once 10 per cent of the planned procurement quantity are produced. The 10
per cent inclusion criterion is used to simplify their data set; however, there is no data-driven
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evidence to validate the claim. Dixon (2005) analyzes the effects of aging on commercial
aircraft and ﬁnds sustainment results in three distinct phases: newness, mature and aging.
Dixon discovers that the newness phase ends at approximately ﬁve-seven years, which may
indicate the initiation of stability. Although commercial aircraft and military aircraft have
distinctly different objectives, there are parallels to the analysis, and age is included as a
variable in our model. While stability has not been explicitly analyzed in the O&S arena, it
has been examined in earned value management (EVM) data. Christensen and Payne use the
cost performance index in EVM as a tool to gauge stability in DoD contracts (Christensen
and Payne, 1992). Petter et al. (2015) add to this research by investigating earned schedule
and its application to stability while analyzing three deﬁnitions of stability. While EVM
focuses on contract performance and is inherently different than O&S’s perpetual nature, the
methodologies provide an insight on how to approach the determination of stability for O&S
costs.
In 2001, the Congressional Budget Ofﬁce (CBO) developed a rudimentary regression
model to predict O&S costs that uses variables from a 1990 RAND study (Hildebrandt and
Sze, 1990). The 2001 study uses the nascent AFTOC database to create the model. The
AFTOC database originated in 1996 resulting in only four years of data in their analysis
(CBO, 2001). Key variables identiﬁed in the model include age, tempo and unit cost.
Incorporating additional years of data and adding programmatic information provides an
opportunity for a more robust model to be built.
Database and methodology
The primary data used in this research include annual O&S costs for 44 aircraft programs
(765 observations) gathered from the AFTOC database. Research is limited to aircraft in the
Air Force inventory and expenditures from 1996 to 2016 because AFTOC does not contain
data prior to 1996 or expenditures from 2017 at the time of this analysis. AFTOC provides
costs in base-year dollars and then-year dollars. For this research, all costs are converted
with Ofﬁce of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) inﬂation indices to base-year 2016 to remove
the effects of inﬂation. Initial operational capability (IOC) dates are needed for
standardization purposes and are found using selected acquisition reports. To ensure
robustness of programs selected for analysis, they must have a total active inventory (TAI)
of over 10 in at least one year of cost data, at least ﬁve years of cost data for a mission design
series (MDS) to be included and an available IOC year. In the data gathering process, some
MDS (variants) shared IOC dates which necessitated grouping. Initial screening of the base
data set is shown in Table I, while Table II highlights the 44 programs used for analysis
grouped by aircraft mission type fromAFTOC.
Once data are collected and screened, costs are standardized by calculating cost per
ﬂying hour (CPFH) and cost per total active inventory (CPTAI) to control for the variance in
hours ﬂown or number of aircraft in the inventory. The three cost types explored are total
Table I.
Initial data set
screening
Screen Remaining MDS
AFTOC 274
TAI>10 146
MDS years data> 5 110
Available IOC date 57
Programs
Grouped by IOC Date 44
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O&S costs, CPFH and CPTAI. “Time from IOC” is standardized by subtracting the IOC year
of a certain MDS from the given year of O&S cost data. For simplicity, the IOC year is
looked at, not the month. Data ranges from 1996 to 2016, but the aircraft included are at
different points in their sustainment phase. For example, in 2010, the C-17A is 17 years from
IOC, while the F-22A is only 5 years from IOC.When all data points are compiled, trends can
be seen in terms of years from IOC for a speciﬁc program.
The determination of stability for cost analysts relies on a year-to-year per cent cost
difference for each year from IOC. In the analysis, the six cost element structures (CES) from
the OSD, cost assessment and program evaluation (OSD CAPE) cost estimating guide,
shown in Table III, are used to highlight differences in stability properties by CES. Total
O&S costs are an aggregate of all six CES, but only the ﬁrst ﬁve CESs are analyzed
individually because of the variance in how indirect costs (CES 6) are levied on different
Table II.
Programs selected by
aircraft type
Fighter/attack Reconnaissance Helicopter
A-10C
A/OA-10
F-117A
F-15A
F-15B
F-15C
F-15D
F-15E
F-16A
F-16B
F-16C
F-16D
F-22A
Bomber
B-1B
B-2A
B-52H
E-3B/C
E-8C
U-2S
Special Duty
AC-130H/U
EC-130E/H
EC-130J
MC-130E/H
MC-130P
Training
T-1A
T-38A/C
T-6A
UAV/Drone
MQ-1B
MQ-9A
RQ-4B
HH-60G
MH-53J/M
UH-1H/N
Transport/Tanker
C-130E/H
C-130J
C-141B/C
C-17A
C-21A
C-5A/B
C-5M
CV-22B
HC-130P/N
KC-10A
KC-135E/R
Table III.
OSD CAPE CES
CES Name Description
1.0 Unit-level Manpower Cost of operators, maintainers, and other support manpower assigned to
operating units. May include military, civilian, and/or contractor manpower
2.0 Unit operations Cost of unit operating material (e.g. fuel and training material), unit support
services, and unit travel. Excludes material for maintenance and repair
3.0 Maintenance Cost of all system maintenance other than maintenance manpower assigned
to operating units. Consists of organic and contractor maintenance
4.0 Sustaining support Cost of system support activities that are provided by organizations other
than the system’s operating units
5.0 Continuing system
improvements
Cost of system hardware and software modiﬁcations
6.0 Indirect support Cost of support activities that provide general services that lack the
visibility of actual support to speciﬁc force units or systems. Indirect
support is generally provided by centrally managed activities that provide a
wide range of support to multiple systems and associated manpower
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programs. Indirect support costs are installation and personnel costs allocated on “a per
capita or some other basis,” which can be ambiguous for cost analysts (OSD CAPE, 2014).
Once individual differences (percentage) are calculated for each year from IOC for all 44
programs, the mean difference for each year from IOC is determined.
Truncating O&S years beyond 40 occurs because of the reasonable assumption of how
long anMDS will be in operation. The 44 selected programs have years of data ranging from
1 to 57 years from IOC. This research aims to determine when stability occurs within the
expected service life. Therefore, OSD CAPE’s largest notional service life duration, which
between ﬁxed wing and rotary aircraft is 40 years, is the cutoff for truncation (OSD CAPE,
2014). This approach is consistent with the prior literature on O&S costs. Jones et al. (2014)
used the OSD CAPE draft estimating guide when ﬁnding the ratio of O&S costs to
development costs and applied services lives of 20-30 years for ﬁghters and helicopters and
30-40 years for cargo, bomber and tanker aircraft. Given these two determinations of service
life, separate analyses are conducted for up to 30 years from IOC and 30-40 years from IOC.
This has the added beneﬁt of examining potential aging effect in the data. The base data set
has 765 programs and year pairs (e.g. F-15A in 1998 or F-22A in 2008), while the truncated
set has 681, which means that only 10.98 per cent of the data points are removed because of
truncation.
The degree of stability is determined through testing per cent bounds. The process starts at
a 20 per cent bound and ﬁnds the ﬁrst year from IOC in which the mean per cent difference
crosses this threshold. That point is then declared the “year from IOC” that stability occurs.
The duration of time it stays within the 20 per cent bound is calculated from the stability point
to 30 years and the stability point to 40 years. If the mean per cent difference falls within the 20
per cent bound for more than 80 per cent of the time from the stability point to 30 years, then
the same process is repeated with a 15 per cent bound. The process is repeated for the 10 and 5
per cent bounds if applicable, with the most restrictive bound being the best point of stability.
This process is completed for all 18 cost combinations comprising the three cost types (total
costs, CPFH and CPTAI) and six cost categories (Total O&S and CES 1-5). Again, CES 6 is
used in the calculation of total O&S but not individually analyzed. The per cent stable to 40
years is not used in the selection of the best bound, but a decrease in per cent of the time stable
can reveal potential aging affects.
After the best bound selection, there is a stability point in terms of years from IOC and a
per cent bound. Next, descriptive statistics are calculated for the mean per cent differences
from the stability point to 30 years from IOC. Using the best bound and descriptive
statistics, it can be determined which cost type and which categories exhibit the most or
least amount of stability. Understanding these steady-state properties, therefore, provides
an insight to cost analysts on the proper time to migrate from the analogy technique to an
extrapolation from actual method. The bounds also inﬂuence the cost risk modeling of the
individual elements when developing a cost estimate. Descriptive statistics for 30-40 years
from IOC are also calculated to highlight any aging affects.
This process is then repeated for each aircraft type. Aircraft are divided into the eight
operational mission categories given by AFTOC: bomber, ﬁghter/attack, helicopter,
reconnaissance, special duty, training, transport/tanker and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV).
It is important to note that splitting the 44 programs into eight categories drastically reduces
the number of data points for each aircraft type. Because of the small sample size, inferential
tests are not conducted to demonstrate differences in aircraft type, but descriptive statistics
can still provide insights. For simplicity, comparisons by aircraft category use the best
metric for stability found at the aggregate level (i.e. CPFH, CPTAI or total costs).
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The second part of this research creates a top-level regression model as a crosscheck
to the cost analyst’s primary estimation techniques for O&S costs. The dependent
variable in this regression analysis is the total CPTAI. AFTOC provides additional
programmatic information in addition to the cost data that are used to create
independent, predictor variables. Examples of programmatic data provided in the
database include average age of aircraft, location of lead logistics center, operational
mission type and unit-cost, among others, discussed in the next section. Stability analysis
results are also incorporated into the model as an additional predictor variable for the
point of stability in terms of years from IOC.
Regression analysis requires a re-screen of the initial data set because of the addition
of variables. Each program and “years from IOC” pair must have only one value for each
potential predictor variable. This screen resulted in ﬁve grouped programs that have two
different unit-costs and one grouped program with two different logistics centers.
C-141B/C, KC-135E/R, MH-53J/M, T-38A/C and UH-1H/N are all programs that had major
overhauls at some point in their service life that created a new MDS and an updated unit
cost. Because of the programs being previously grouped by IOC year, these ﬁve are
removed from regression analysis for having two unit-costs. The program with two
logistics centers is the EC-130E/H and is included in the regression data set because
location of logistics center is a binary variable that may inﬂuence the O&S cost. Table IV
illustrates the re-screen of the base data set.
Prior to any model building, the re-screened regression database is separated into two
groups: the model building data set and validation set. For multiple regression, a random
sampling of the data uses approximately 80 per cent for the model building portion and 20
per cent for the validation set. Variables may or may not be included in the model depending
on the individual signiﬁcance and contingent on passing regression diagnostics. The mixed
stepwise function in JMP Pro Version 12 is used to determine which predictor variables are
initially included in the model. A signiﬁcance level of 0.05 is the threshold to enter or exit
the model. The assumption of normality is assessed using the Shapiro–Wilk test, while the
assumption of constant variance is assessed with the Breusch–Pagan test. Both tests are
conducted at the 0.05 level of signiﬁcance. Failing to satisfy the assumption of constant
variance can potentially be remedied with natural log transformation of the dependent and/
or independent variables. The natural log transformation results in the predicted model
value being the median response rather than a mean.
Furthermore, multicollinearity, inﬂuential data points and outliers are investigated to
prevent additional bias. Variance inﬂation factors (VIFs) highlight linear relationships
between two variables and a VIF higher than 5 indicates multicollinearity. Cook’s distance
detects inﬂuential data points that could be skewing the model, and any value greater than
0.5 is investigated thoroughly. Any studentized residual that is greater than three standard
deviations from the mean is considered an outlier andmust also be investigated further. The
ﬁnal assessment is the Bonferroni–Holm correction, which aims to control the family-wise
error rate and reduces Type I error (false positives).
Table IV.
Rescreening of
base data set for
regression analysis
Screen Programs Observations remaining
Base data set 44 892
Duplicate unit costs 39 708
Has value for each variable 39 609
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Once all diagnostics are passed, the model building set is validated against the validation set
using multiple criteria: mean absolute percentage error (MAPE), median absolute
percentage error (MdAPE) and adjusted R2. When the model is deemed internally valid, then
all data points are combined to update the ﬁnal model using the variables selected from the
model building process.
Results
Stability analysis
The stability analysis begins by examining the mean per cent differences for CPTAI at each
year from IOC, up to 40 years (Figure 1). The number of programs used in the calculations of
mean per cent difference for a speciﬁed “years from IOC” range from 8 to 24. The table
displays total CPTAI and the ﬁve O&S CESs CPTAI. Mean values are color coordinated
from red to green at 5 per cent bins, where dark red is equivalent to greater than 20 per cent
difference and dark green is equivalent to under 5 per cent difference. Tables for total O&S
cost and CPFH are attached in the Appendix and demonstrate similar characteristics. Note
that CES 4 and 5 do not fall under the 20 per cent threshold at any point and are, therefore,
removed from further analysis. While it may seem capricious to remove two of the ﬁve
categories, O’Hanlon (2018) determined that CES 1, 2 and 3 constitute the majority of O&S
costs with a mean of 82.39 per cent andmedian of 80.53 per cent.
The best bound selection process and descriptive statistics for all combinations (minus
CES 4 and 5) are summarized in Table V. Looking at the table, several conclusions can be
drawn from the data. For instance, CES 1 (Manpower) and 2 (Unit operations) have much
lower means andmedians than CES 3 (Maintenance). This indicates that manpower and pay
are fairly stable. Operation tempo and fuel consumption is usually planned in advance and
may contribute to unit operations’ costs having a more consistent nature as well.
Maintenance, especially unplanned maintenance, is much harder to predict, and that may
explain why less stability is exhibited in CES 3 across all cost combinations. The cost type
(total, CPFH or CPTAI) that has the lowest best bounds is CPTAI which displays lower
means and medians than the other two cost categories. In addition to the conclusions across
cost type and cost categories, there appears to be aging affects in total costs and CPTAI but
not for CPFH combinations. Aging can be seen when the per cent stable to 40 years from
IOC is less than per cent stable to 30 years from IOC. While it does not show the direction in
which costs are going, it does show that there is less stability later in the sustainment phase.
In addition, the mean andmedian values for CPFH are higher, which indicate instability.
The last segment of stability analysis searches for differences across aircraft categories.
The sample size to calculate means drops sizably when splitting the 44 programs into eight
different categories, which limits the ﬁdelity of inferential statistics. In addition, not all
aircraft platform types have data points for all years from IOC in between 1 and 40. For this
reason, bounds testing and descriptive statistics provided for the various aircraft platform
types are catered to the available data of the aircraft type. CPTAI was the best metric in the
aggregate analysis, with stability demonstrated at the 10 per cent bound, a trend that
appears the same across all platform types. For this reason, the research hones in on CPTAI
as the basis for category comparison. Besides helicopters, which has its ﬁrst year of data 11
years from IOC, all aircraft types exhibit stability properties till ﬁve years from IOC. As
shown in Table VI, there are potentially three distinct groupings for the means of per cent
differences after stability occurs. Bombers, ﬁghter/attack, training and transport/tanker
have total CPTAI means around 7 per cent and medians from 5 to 7 per cent.
Reconnaissance and helicopters are at 8.55 and 9.55 per cent, respectively, with medians
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around 7 per cent. Special duty aircrafts and UAVs appear to be different from the rest in the
total CPTAI category with means around 11-12 per cent andmedians from 10 to 12 per cent.
Multiple regression analysis
The second portion of analysis creates a regression model by utilizing knowledge from the
aforementioned CBO/RAND study and builds upon it with additional programmatic
information from AFTOC and results from the stability analysis of this research. The
Figure 1.
Mean per cent
difference for CPTAI
Years from 
IOC
CPTAI 
Total
CPTAI 
CES 1
CPTAI 
CES 2
CPTAI 
CES 3
CPTAI 
CES 4
CPTAI 
CES 5
1 644.8% 847.3% 2704.0% 246.4% 232.7% 37.8%
2 27.0% 24.7% 43.3% 60.6% 51.1% 100.7%
3 39.2% 207.0% 25.7% 70.0% 144.9% 1,360.0%
4 13.3% 15.6% 15.8% 35.4% 945.8% 157.0%
5 23.5% 11.1% 17.2% 21,263.8% 53.0% 40.3%
6 6.3% 11.9% 25.7% 12.0% 68.7% 117.2%
7 10.0% 14.5% 14.7% 20.7% 232.8% 70.7%
8 11.0% 11.4% 21.8% 24.6% 71.0% 46.6%
9 11.0% 7.3% 25.2% 18.2% 112.6% 63.5%
10 8.7% 7.4% 11.4% 18.5% 201.9% 56.0%
11 9.6% 8.3% 16.1% 20.8% 91.0% 91.2%
12 6.6% 6.9% 10.9% 11.7% 21.0% 25.8%
13 12.5% 9.5% 6.3% 36.4% 43.3% 33.4%
14 7.4% 7.1% 11.6% 11.9% 198.0% 54.8%
15 8.4% 8.9% 17.8% 22.3% 145.1% 27.9%
16 10.6% 8.4% 10.5% 25.2% 310.3% 94.0%
17 7.2% 6.8% 12.8% 13.8% 58.0% 39.7%
18 9.1% 7.2% 14.0% 22.2% 90.9% 48.4%
19 5.1% 4.5% 8.8% 12.3% 58.5% 37.3%
20 6.4% 8.2% 9.2% 14.7% 73.7% 31.0%
21 10.5% 7.9% 13.2% 21.4% 93.7% 54.5%
22 8.8% 8.3% 13.3% 18.0% 102.0% 113.4%
23 6.4% 6.7% 11.2% 15.6% 45.3% 43.6%
24 8.4% 13.2% 10.1% 17.6% 133.0% 149.5%
25 7.4% 11.2% 9.1% 10.1% 24.2% 45.9%
26 9.3% 9.0% 10.1% 17.1% 33.3% 22.6%
27 6.1% 5.9% 13.0% 12.5% 57.3% 45.8%
28 8.8% 10.9% 6.6% 16.8% 16.5% 53.7%
29 6.4% 8.9% 13.1% 13.3% 29.3% 178.5%
30 9.0% 6.9% 12.4% 14.1% 40.6% 278.9%
31 5.4% 4.1% 9.7% 9.4% 51.8% 26.2%
32 6.5% 5.5% 15.2% 10.9% 54.6% 35.0%
33 8.0% 5.7% 9.9% 15.3% 29.6% 94.0%
34 10.7% 9.0% 18.8% 12.4% 42.1% 7,010.8%
35 13.3% 12.9% 12.4% 26.9% 43.5% 94.6%
36 7.5% 4.3% 11.6% 15.9% 28.9% 69.9%
37 8.7% 7.4% 12.8% 20.8% 39.6% 45.5%
38 11.5% 10.7% 13.8% 18.2% 45.3% 228.1%
39 7.8% 10.9% 12.4% 15.6% 36.3% 85.0%
40 11.6% 9.5% 16.1% 17.5% 58.7% 188.4%
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Table V.
Summary statistics
(excluding CES
4 and 5)
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dependent variable in the model is the natural log of total O&S CPTAI. When running
diagnostics, the Breusch–Pagan test for constant variance repeatedly failed; however,
natural log transformation of CPTAI and two predictor variables provided a more constant
variance of residuals. The initial independent variable set to be investigated is shown in
Table VII.
Of the independent variables tested in the model building set, two binary variables were
removed for insigniﬁcance during the step-wise process at the 0.05 level: contract vs organic
logistics support and all binary variables for years from IOC. Of the remaining 13 predictor
variables, all exhibited individual signiﬁcance below the comparison-wise error rate of
Table VI.
Total CPTAI
summary statistics
(stable to 30 years
from IOC) by aircraft
type
Aircraft type Years to stability Best bound (%) Mean (%) SD (%) Median (%)
Training 1 10 7.09 5.44 5.85
Transport/ tanker 5 10 7.17 4.26 6.68
Bombers* 0 15 7.27 5.61 5.97
Fighter/attack 2 10 7.42 2.93 6.94
Reconnaissance 3 15 8.55 6.84 6.94
Helicopters 10 15 9.55 6.34 7.77
Special duty** 0 20 11.26 7.67 10.00
UAV 5 15 12.55 5.08 12.02
Notes: *When tested to a 10% bound, bombers had 70.00% stability; **when tested to 15% bound, special
duty had 76.67% stability
Table VII.
Predictor variables
analyzed in
regression analysis
Name
Type of
variable(s) Description Source
Unit cost Continuous Unit cost of the aircraft for the program AFTOC
Tempo Continuous Total ﬂight hours in a year divided by the TAI AFTOC
Average age Continuous Average age of all aircraft in the program at the end
of the year
AFTOC
Location of lead
logistics center
Binary Location of the lead air logistics center (ALC). The
base case is Ogden Logistics Center (OO-ALC).
Binary variables are created for Warner Robins Air
Logistics Center (WR-ALC), Aeronautical Systems
Center (ASC), and Oklahoma City Logistics Center
(OC-ALC)
AFTOC
Contract vs
organic logistics
support
Binary Describe if the program is currently being
maintained by contract logistic support (CLS) or
organic logistics support
AFTOC
Mission type Binary There are eight mission types as delineated in
AFTOC: Bombers, Fighter/Attack, Helicopters,
Reconnaissance, Special Duty, Training, Transport/
Tanker, and UAV. The base case in the research is
Transport/Tanker
AFTOC
Years from IOC Binary These variables include years 1 through 30 from IOC
to determine if any speciﬁc years may be signiﬁcant
SARs, Deagel.com,
Af.mil
Stable vs
unstable
Binary Derived from the stability portion of the research
and indicates whether the program is considered
stable or not. Metric used is 5 years from IOC for
CPTAI
Findings from
stability analysis
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0.05/13 = 0.00384 for the Holm–Bonferroni correction. For the 80 per cent model building set,
the MAPE is 0.0131 (1.31 per cent) and theMdAPE is 0.0095 (0.95 per cent). In the 20 per cent
validation set, MAPE is 0.0108 (1.08 per cent) and MdAPE is 0.0071 (0.71 per cent). The
adjusted R2 values for the model and validation sets are 0.8878 and 0.902, respectively. The
close similarities in absolute percentage error and adjusted R2 values suggest a valid model.
Combining all data points, the updated model has an R2 value of 0.8901, which means
that the model explains 89.01 per cent of the variance in the data set when predicting median
total CPTAI. The model’s largest VIF is 6.60 for the binary variable representing Warner
Robins as the lead logistics center. All remaining values are below 5; however, this indicates
there may be some minor multicollinearity in the model. The highest Cook’s D is 0.367,
which is below the 0.5 threshold for inﬂuential data points. The Shapiro–Wilk test fails the
normality test with a p-value of <0.001, and the Breusch–Pagan test fails the test for
constant variance with a p-value of <0.001. Though the tests fail statistically, a more in-
depth examination of the studentized residuals shows that values centered around the mean
and the residual vs predicted plot show no apparent trend. Ordinary least squares
regression is also robust against minor or moderate deviations from constant variance and
normality (Cohen et al., 2003). Natural log transformation of the response variable as well as
two predictor variables, unit-cost and tempo, provided a more constant variance of
residuals. Final regression results are shown in Table VIII. The MAPE for the ﬁnal model is
0.0126 (1.26 per cent) and MdAPE is 0.00913 (0.91 per cent), which indicates the model has a
low relative error when predicting the natural log of total CPTAI.
Discussion and conclusion
This research determines to ascertain where stability occurs in O&S costs, and how it is
exhibited using a variety of metrics. Overall, we ﬁnd that the CPTAI metric is the best
metric when seeking to determine stability. The cost type that exhibits less stability is the
CPHF metric, which could be because of the high variance in ﬂight hours and differences in
mission types. Recall that the OSD-CAPE CES (Table III) is the structure used by analysts in
constructing their estimates. Analysis of the CES illustrates that manpower (CES 1) and unit
operations (CES 2) exhibit the highest degree of stability, while maintenance (CES 3) is the
lowest. At the top level, CPTAI reaches stability ﬁve years from IOC and coincides with
Table VIII.
Final ordinary least
squares model
Predictor variable Estimate p-value Standardized estimate V I F
Intercept 3.389 <0.0001 N/A N/A
LN unit cost 0.407 <0.0001 0.634 2.02
LN tempo (Fly hours/TAI) 0.736 <0.0001 0.475 3.39
Average age 0.018 <0.0001 0.232 1.98
Fighter/attack 0.514 <0.0001 0.230 4.71
Bomber 0.802 <0.0001 0.270 3.00
Special duty 0.304 <0.0001 0.131 1.61
Reconnaissance 0.690 <0.0001 0.234 1.61
Helicopter 0.386 <0.0001 0.079 1.34
Trainer 0.572 <0.0001 0.149 2.29
Stable 0.188 <0.0001 0.072 1.41
WR-ALC (Warner Robbins) 0.792 <0.0001 0.465 6.60
ASC (Wright-Patt) 0.599 <0.0001 0.255 4.47
OC-ALC (Oklahoma City) 0.503 <0.0001 0.260 5.11
WR-ALC * Fighter/attack interaction 0.611 <0.0001 0.166 1.84
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Dixon’s (2005) research on commercial aircraft exiting the newness phase when average
aircraft age is ﬁve-six years. Dixon’s research is standardized by average age and CPHF but
it presents similar results to our analysis. Our categorical analysis (using CPTAI as the
metric) ﬁnds two-three distinct groupings, with stability typically occurring from 0 to 5
years from IOC. Practical applications of these ﬁndings for DoD cost analysts and decision-
makers is straightforward. Programmatic decisions, such as the aforementioned U-2 vs
Global-Hawk decisions, are based partially on out-year sustainment costs. Understanding
the stability properties of these costs provides an increased conﬁdence in the estimates
provided and the decisions upon which they are based.
In addition to analyzing stability properties, this research develops a robust regression
model to predict median total O&S costs for aircraft. It is important to note that this tool is
intended to be used as a crosscheck in conjunction with primary methods when creating
estimates. The model has an R2 of 0.8901, which is a signiﬁcant explanation of the variance
in the data. Table IX displays the relative contribution for the variable types as determined
by standardized beta estimates. Aircraft type, location of lead logistics center and unit cost
are the three largest contributing factors to the model and comprise over 74 per cent of the
relative weights in the total model. Standard practice is for analysts to use a multitude of
techniques to enhance conﬁdence in the estimates provided. The model developed here
serves as another technique for the analyst’s toolkit.
There are several limitations to this research. Perhaps the most signiﬁcant limitation in
determining stability is that the research standardizes by years from IOC. In theory, it is a
reasonable way to standardize, but in reality, programs distinguish initial capability
differently. Programs may declare IOC earlier than when they should because of schedule or
other pressures. In other cases, programs incur O&S costs for multiple years before
declaring IOC which skews the data to show stability sooner. This limitation is well
documented in other works such as Kozlak et al. (2017) and Jimenez et al. (2016), who also
used IOC dates as a standardization point. A second limitation with respect to IOC is that the
year is used rather than the month for IOC dates for simplicity reasons. Finally, our
investigation is limited to only Air Force aircraft. While the stability results coincide with
Dixon’s (2005) research with commercial aircraft, it is impossible to tell if these
characteristics are the same as those of other service aircraft or other types of programs.
There are multiple areas where future research is warranted. Stability properties of other
military services weapon systems could be investigated using the methodology of this
paper. The visibility and management of operating and support costs database contains the
necessary O&S costs for other services. Additionally, an investigation into CES 6, indirect
costs, to develop an allocation model would allow for future researchers to use this CES in
their analysis. Other future research could examine O&S cost property behavior in times of
war in comparison to peacetime.
Table IX.
Predictor variables
(grouped) and
relative contribution
to model
Predictor variables (Grouped) Relative contribution (%)
LN unit cost 17.4
LN tempo 13.0
Average age 6.4
Stable 2.0
Logistics center 26.8
Aircraft type 29.9
Interaction term 4.5
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The new emphasis placed on understanding O&S costs from the WSARA legislation has
resulted in a nascent research stream that is growing. This research adds to the body of
knowledge by providing cost analysts and decision-makers with tools to help determine
when Air Force aircraft can be considered to have stabilized O&S costs. A determination of
stability allows for better budgeting practices because cost analysts can then switch from
using analogous programs to extrapolating from actual data. In addition, we provide a new
parametric model that predicts median O&S costs for programs in varying stages in the life
cycle. Convergence around an estimate from multiple techniques provides conﬁdence in the
decision upon which they are based.
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Appendix
FigureA1.
Mean per cent
difference (total O&S)
Years from IOC O&S Total CES 1 CES 2 CES 3 CES 4 CES 5 
1 1,432.0% 1,817.9% 5,561.7% 822.2% 627.5% 49.7% 
2 76.1% 89.1% 84.3% 99.4% 85.8% 241.4% 
3 85.8% 390.5% 55.8% 131.8% 254.4% 1,694.9% 
4 30.0% 35.2% 19.7% 47.1% 1321.1%  188.4% 
5 38.4% 21.3% 28.4% 27,984.8% 55.4% 39.8% 
6 13.5% 21.1% 31.2% 15.4% 75.9% 137.3% 
7 12.2% 19.4% 17.1% 22.4% 230.7% 96.4% 
8 16.3% 14.2% 28.8% 29.0% 73.3% 51.9% 
9 12.7% 10.5% 23.2% 19.8% 127.2% 68.2% 
10 12.1% 9.6% 13.3% 20.2% 203.9% 60.3% 
11 21.0% 21.7% 33.1% 23.1% 125.1% 113.3% 
12 7.8% 9.1% 10.2% 12.9% 22.2% 26.9% 
13 14.6% 11.5% 6.3% 39.5% 42.7% 33.2% 
14 7.0% 7.5% 12.1% 11.7% 196.7% 57.9% 
15 8.6% 9.8% 18.8% 22.4% 146.3% 26.3% 
16 10.6% 8.7% 10.5% 24.7% 307.9% 97.0% 
17 7.1% 7.9% 13.6% 12.8% 60.5% 38.5% 
18 7.7% 7.6% 13.8% 19.1% 92.1% 45.4% 
19 4.7% 4.7% 9.2% 11.6% 57.0% 36.1% 
20 7.3% 8.5% 8.8% 13.3% 75.0% 32.6% 
21 8.6% 6.4% 12.5% 19.6% 93.3% 50.5% 
22 9.3% 9.1% 13.2% 17.7% 103.6% 113.1% 
23 6.2% 8.2% 10.9% 13.4% 43.8% 41.9% 
24 7.9% 14.2% 10.8% 16.2% 132.6% 149.5% 
25 9.4% 11.6% 9.4% 12.2% 26.4% 46.1% 
26 7.7% 7.6% 13.1% 15.1% 30.7% 22.5% 
27 7.9% 5.3% 14.0% 14.5% 57.4% 46.6% 
28 10.8% 9.1% 12.5% 18.6% 22.2% 54.0% 
29 12.4% 11.9% 18.4% 17.8% 33.3% 176.6% 
30 12.6% 9.6% 14.2% 14.5% 42.7% 269.9% 
31 9.0% 7.6% 13.0% 11.4% 52.7% 24.8% 
32 11.1% 8.9% 18.4% 14.1% 45.9% 38.2% 
33 16.7% 15.0% 18.5% 21.4% 30.1% 86.6% 
34 16.0% 13.7% 18.3% 18.3% 50.6% 2,809.0% 
35 17.2% 19.1% 20.4% 21.4% 50.1% 95.0% 
36 9.5% 6.1% 12.7% 16.7% 30.1% 69.0% 
37 10.0% 10.8% 14.2% 20.6% 28.4% 46.6% 
38 11.4% 15.7% 10.9% 21.4% 46.9% 188.5% 
39 13.6% 10.4% 17.8% 18.6% 31.4% 77.5% 
40 15.9% 14.8% 19.5% 22.1% 56.8% 185.5% 
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FigureA2.
Mean per cent
difference CPFH
Years 
from IOC 
CPFH 
Total 
CPFH 
CES 1 
CPFH 
CES 2 
CPFH CES 
3 
CPFH 
CES 4 
CPFH 
CES 5 
1 649.4% 874.5% 2,772.6% 142.4% 190.4% 61.3% 
2 42.0% 36.3% 52.9% 76.0% 50.6% 107.5% 
3 20.0% 93.9% 17.4% 49.2% 133.1% 1,327.7% 
4 13.5% 14.9% 14.5% 37.2% 374.2% 134.8% 
5 18.1% 11.5% 16.8% 18,954.7% 55.5% 40.1% 
6 14.9% 21.1% 21.2% 20.5% 70.3% 121.6% 
7 13.7% 18.7% 13.6% 21.2% 174.3% 87.3% 
8 15.6% 20.0% 20.2% 21.9% 61.5% 46.3% 
9 12.4% 9.0% 24.5% 19.8% 103.9% 61.5% 
10 10.0% 11.9% 11.5% 19.0% 192.0% 52.5% 
11 13.6% 12.8% 13.1% 23.9% 78.2% 103.8% 
12 10.8% 10.6% 12.3% 16.3% 24.2% 28.4% 
13 13.5% 13.4% 5.7% 39.3% 42.0% 36.4% 
14 5.4% 8.4% 8.0% 13.1% 197.0% 54.7% 
15 11.3% 11.9% 20.1% 24.6% 140.4% 28.1% 
16 10.3% 6.8% 8.3% 25.1% 314.3% 92.2% 
17 8.0% 10.1% 14.6% 16.4% 61.0% 41.0% 
18 9.6% 9.4% 10.3% 21.1% 89.1% 49.3% 
19 9.0% 6.9% 8.3% 17.2% 64.1% 38.0% 
20 7.4% 9.5% 8.1% 16.1% 77.0% 32.5% 
21 13.3% 12.8% 12.5% 23.9% 96.6% 64.0% 
22 9.0% 11.1% 12.1% 18.2% 98.5% 101.7% 
23 9.0% 11.9% 6.4% 18.4% 45.7% 41.1% 
24 9.3% 18.9% 8.9% 17.7% 152.1% 150.1% 
25 7.0% 13.7% 6.4% 8.8% 22.4% 45.2% 
26 15.8% 18.5% 8.9% 21.4% 40.3% 24.0% 
27 9.1% 12.2% 8.9% 15.4% 56.0% 43.2% 
28 16.6% 23.0% 10.3% 12.0% 25.6% 58.0% 
29 9.6% 17.5% 9.7% 21.4% 36.8% 175.5% 
30 13.1% 14.7% 15.3% 18.3% 36.8% 223.4% 
31 8.9% 10.7% 10.5% 14.2% 57.3% 23.5% 
32 8.9% 12.5% 9.6% 15.0% 72.6% 37.8% 
33 7.0% 12.0% 9.2% 13.0% 36.1% 95.2% 
34 10.2% 16.0% 8.6% 13.8% 46.3% 4,096.2% 
35 17.9% 21.8% 7.8% 29.5% 51.9% 124.0% 
36 5.9% 7.3% 5.0% 13.8% 23.9% 66.8% 
37 6.8% 13.0% 11.3% 15.5% 32.9% 43.0% 
38 9.2% 16.3% 7.2% 18.7% 46.4% 192.6% 
39 11.8% 13.2% 7.3% 23.1% 46.3% 81.9% 
40 9.0% 11.6% 11.4% 17.0% 53.5% 174.4% 
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